Trading Privacy for Angry Birds: A Call for Courts to
Reevaluate Privacy Expectations in Modern Smartphones
Jeremy Andrew Ciarabellini*
“That the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found
necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of
such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the
recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth,
grows to meet the demands of society.”1
“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at
the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy
that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to
this development as inevitable.”2
“There is nothing concealed that will not be disclosed, or hidden
that will not be made known. What you have said in the dark will be
heard in the daylight, and what you have whispered in the ear in the inner rooms will be proclaimed from the roofs.”3
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all the smartphone uses, the calling function is probably used the
least. Rather, individuals more commonly use their smartphone for surfing the web, checking Facebook, and playing games. Highlighting the
“smart” in smartphone, these phones often know more about their users’
*
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1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
2. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
3. Luke 12:2–3 (New International Version).
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daily activities than the users. Without requiring any sort of input,
smartphones can tell the user how many steps they walk each day, when
it is time to leave for work (also, of course, determining the traveling
time with the most up-to-date traffic reports), and when an item recently
ordered on Amazon will be delivered. Smartphone users may instinctively know that they could dig into their phones’ settings and turn off these
features. They may also know that if their phones are telling them information about their daily activities, they are likely sharing that same information with third parties—targeted advertisements come to mind. Of
course, all of the downloaded “apps” had some sort of agreement that the
user probably did not read and just clicked “yes.” The reality is that people enjoy the conveniences offered by smartphones and give little
thought to any privacy implications. In practice, it seems smartphone
users are willing to trade their privacy to play Angry Birds.
First introduced to the public in 1983,4 cell phones have evolved to
now allow average citizens to carry internet-connected computers in their
pockets.5 With such rapid technology advancement, it is unsurprising that
the legal system has yet to establish a consistent privacy-based jurisprudence when it comes to smartphones and government searches.6 Currently, courts are examining governmental searches of private smartphones
under the Fourth Amendment.7 However, the problem is that when the
courts analyze the legality of a warrantless smartphone search by police,
they summarily assume that the predicate “reasonable expectation of privacy” requirement exists for there to be a “search” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Courts then move directly into analyzing whether the search was appropriate under an exception to the warrant requirement—this most commonly being the “search incident to arrest” excep-

4. Cell Phone Timeline, SOFTSCHOOLS, http://www.softschools.com/timelines/cell_phone_
timeline/28/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). Motorola released the first cell phones ten years after Dr.
Martin Cooper invented the first handheld phone that did not need to be powered through a car. See
id.
5. The growth of cell phone technology was very rapid. In 1989, Motorola introduced the first
flip phone, and by 1993 text messaging was invented. Id. In 2002, Sanyo produced the first camera
phones, which allowed users to connect their phones to a computer and print their pictures. Id. And
in a move that will likely be seen as changing the course of human history, Apple released the first
iPhone in 2007. Id. The iPhone allowed users to perform on their cell phone almost any task that
could be performed on their home computers. Id.
6. See infra Parts III, IV. “Greater discussion of this topic is due to both increased cell phone
usage and constantly evolving cell phone technology.” Ashley B. Snyder, Comment, The Fourth
Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When Is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 155, 162 (2011).
7. See infra Parts III–V.
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tion.8 Similarly, scholars are also guilty of making this assumption about
privacy expectations.9
It is the position of this Note that courts need to take a step back in
their Fourth Amendment analysis and carefully evaluate whether individuals do in fact have the requisite privacy expectations. Specifically,
this Note argues that with the advancement in smartphone technology
and the ubiquity of privacy waivers in “apps,” smartphone users too often share their personal information to third parties to reasonably claim
any general expectation of privacy to the data in their smartphones. Individuals have traded the convenience of smartphones at the expense of
their privacy.
In this Note, Part II examines the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment and the history of the search incident to arrest exception to
the warrant requirement. Part III surveys how various lower courts explore privacy rights in smartphones/cell phones and apply the search incident to arrest exception.10 Part IV describes two fairly recent Supreme
Court decisions that call for an examination of privacy expectations in
smartphones and how the scholarly commentary on those decisions mistakenly maintains the primary focus on the search incident to arrest exception. Part V looks at the Supreme Court’s most recent
smartphone/cell phone search case and its failure to examine privacy expectations. Part VI presents data that modern smartphones users continue
to download apps despite the ubiquity of privacy waivers. Part VII argues that an application of the third-party doctrine may vitiate any argument that an expectation of privacy in modern smartphones exists. Part
VIII concludes.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment states that it is “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”11 The framers’ policy reasoning behind
this Amendment was the desire to have magistrates, rather than law enforcement, determine the permissibility and limitations of searches and
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. While there is no standard definition of “smartphone” within the mobile phone industry,
this Note uses the term in reference to mobile phones containing an operating system and capable of
downloading apps. See Adam Fendelman, How Are Cell Phones Different From Smartphones?,
ABOUT TECH, http://cellphones.about.com/od/coveringthebasics/qt/cellphonesvssmartphones.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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seizures.12 This policy comes from the belief that magistrates, not law
enforcement, are best able “[t]o provide the necessary security against
unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives of individuals.”13 As such,
“where there is a [reasonable] expectation of privacy, and no warrant is
obtained, the search or seizure is generally illegal, and the evidence obtained thereby is generally excluded, unless an exception to the warrant
requirement applies.”14 However, a warrant is not required where there is
no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—i.e., where
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the object being
searched.15
Therefore, as the threshold inquiry for determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object being
searched, the court asks the following two questions: (1) does the individual subjected to the search exhibit an actual expectation of privacy,
and (2) is that expectation one “that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.”16 This test originates from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz v. United States and is commonly referred to as the Katz test.17 This
test “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.”18 In
essence, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis requires balancing the State’s need to conduct searches and the individual’s right to privacy.19 Should the court recognize a privacy expectation, it then analyzes
whether an exception to the warrant requirement exists.
Although the Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches
(where a recognized privacy interest exists) are per se unreasonable,20 the
Court recognizes many exceptions.21 One of these exceptions is the
search incident to arrest.22 The search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement permits government agents to search a person and
his belongings upon a valid arrest to ensure officer safety and to preserve
12. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948).
13. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758–59 (1969) (quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699, 705, 708 (1948)).
14. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1066 (2015).
15. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990) (regarding the exceptions); Illinois
v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (regarding the expectation of privacy); see also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
16. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
19. See id.
20. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 592–93 (1982).
21. 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, PETER J. HENNING & SARAH N
WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 675 (4th ed. 2010).
22. Id.
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evidence.23 This exception is the most commonly litigated issue of warrantless smartphone/cell phone searches.
Courts applying the search incident to arrest exception to warrantless smartphone/cell phone searches do not apply the exception uniformly.24 While this section details the history of the search incident to arrest
exception and how it came to be applied to cell phone searches, it is remarkable that courts largely overlook the threshold question—whether
there is a reasonable expectation of cell phone privacy25—and jump almost directly into search incident to arrest analysis.
The Supreme Court’s early jurisprudence on the search incident to
arrest exception is unclear and primarily mentioned in dicta.26 However,
the Court explicitly established this exception in Chimel v. California in
1969.27 In Chimel, officers arrived at the house of the defendant to serve
an arrest warrant for a coin shop burglary.28 When the officers handed
the defendant the warrant, they asked for permission to “look around” the
house.29 Although the defendant objected, the officers conducted a search
of the home, even though they had no warrant to do so.30 For nearly an
hour, the officers searched the entire house, directing the defendant’s
wife to open various drawers and move the contents around so they could
thoroughly see what was inside.31 The officers seized numerous items,
including the stolen coins.32 Over the defendant’s objections that the
items were unconstitutionally seized and admitted into evidence, the defendant was convicted of the burglary.33 On appeal, the Supreme Court
announced that

23. Sara M. Corradi, Comment, Be Reasonable! Limit Warrantless Smart Phone Searches to
Gant’s Justification for Searches Incident to Arrest, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 943, 945 (2013).
24. See infra Parts III, IV.B.
25. Put another way, whether the Fourth Amendment applies in the first place.
26. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (stating that there is a right of the government “under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and
seize the fruits or evidence of crime.”)); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 755–56 (1969)
(“When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control
which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and
held as evidence in the prosecution.”). See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927);
Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
27. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
28. Id. at 753.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 753–54.
31. Id. at 754.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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[w]hen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
[arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by
a like rule. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of
the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control” . . . .34

However, applying the rule to the case, the Court held that the search of
the defendant’s house went “far beyond” the defendant’s person and his
immediate area; therefore, the search was not reasonable.35
Four years after Chimel, the Court expanded the search incident to
arrest exception in United States v. Robinson.36 In Robinson, the defendant was pulled over and subsequently arrested for driving with a revoked
license.37 The officer searched the defendant’s person and found a cigarette package in the defendant’s coat pocket.38 Being able to feel that the
package contained something other than cigarettes, the officer opened the
package and found heroin.39 The heroin was admitted into evidence and
used to convict the defendant of a drug offense.40 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the officer was “entitled” to inspect the cigarette
package because the search was incident to a valid arrest; therefore, the
discovered heroin was properly seized and admitted into evidence.41 The
Court concluded that the search was reasonable, even without a concern
about the loss of evidence or officer safety, because “[h]aving in the
course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes,
[the officer] was entitled to inspect it.”42 The Court’s holding in Robinson establishes that the search incident to arrest exception is “limited to
personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.”43
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address this exception in the context of smartphones/cell phones until 2014 in Riley v.

34. Id. at 762–63.
35. Id. at 768.
36. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
37. Id. at 220.
38. Id. at 222–23.
39. Id. at 223.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 236.
42. Id.
43. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 15 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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California,44 there was precedent set in the interim involving other
emerging technologies such as wiretapping,45 aerial photography,46 thermal detection,47 and GPS monitoring.48 The Court’s examination of a
warrantless search of a pager in City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon is perhaps
most analogous to a cell phone search.49
In Quon, the City of Ontario, California employed the petitioner as
a police officer.50 In 2001, the City issued the petitioner a pager to send
and receive work-related text messages.51 However, before giving the
pager to the petitioner, the City announced a “computer policy” that
specified that the City “reserve[d] the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and internet use, with or without notice,”
and the employees should not expect any privacy when using such
items.52 While the policy did not apply to text messages on its face, the
City did tell its employees—including the petitioner—that it would treat
text messages as falling under the computer policy.53 Soon after receiving the pager, the petitioner went over his monthly text message limit.54
Initially, the City told the petitioner that it did not intend on auditing his
text messages to see if the overage was due to personal use, suggesting
that the petitioner could pay for the overage costs rather than have to go
through an audit process.55 As such, the petitioner continued to exceed
the limits over the following months and reimbursed the City each
time.56 However, the City ultimately decided to audit the petitioner’s text
messages to evaluate whether the overages were due to personal use or
whether the existing text message limit was too low.57 The City discovered that the many of the petitioner’s messages were personal—some
sexually explicit—and determined that the petitioner was violating the
City’s policy.58 The City disciplined the petitioner for the violations.59

44. See id. at 2480.
45. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530–31 (1985).
46. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–39 (1986).
47. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 46 (2001).
48. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952–54 (2012).
49. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
50. Id. at 750.
51. Id. at 751.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 752.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 752–53.
59. Id. at 753.
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The petitioner filed a suit against the City in federal court alleging
that the City violated his Fourth Amendment right by obtaining and reviewing his text messages without a warrant.60 Before the Supreme Court
considered the specific issue presented, it noted that the Court “must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on
the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its
role in society has become clear.”61 The Court further noted that “[r]apid
changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission
are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as
proper behavior.”62 In its comments, the Court cannot have anticipated
the truthfulness of the following words, written just one year into the
iPhone era:
Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary
instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might
strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand,
the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable,
so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their
own.63

Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court assumed, arguendo, that
the petitioner did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
messages, and that the search performed fell within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.64 Ultimately, the Court held that the search was reasonable under the “special needs” of the workplace exception for warrantless searches.65 However, the Court’s assumption that there was a
privacy expectation left the opinion’s discussion of cell phone and text
message privacy as merely dicta. Without a firm standard set by the Supreme Court, lower courts were left to develop their own warrantless cell
phone, and eventually smartphone, search jurisprudence. Unfortunately,
many lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s example and just
assumed that a privacy right exists in smartphones/cell phones.
60. Id. at 754.
61. Id. at 759 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 760.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 761–62.
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III. THE LOWER COURTS RECOGNIZE A PRIVACY INTEREST AND APPLY
THE EXCEPTION
Before the Supreme Court decided that the search incident to arrest
exception does not apply to smartphones/cell phones (skipping the preliminary question of whether a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred at
all),66 the lower courts came to varying conclusions. Remarkably, the
fast-developing technology forced courts of all levels to hear
smartphone/cell phone cases even before the Supreme Court in Quon
was able to comment on privacy implications.67 The leading lower court
decision in this area is United States v. Finley.68 Contextually, Finley is
important because it was issued the same year that Apple released the
first iPhone.69 While the Fifth Circuit applied the correct test in determining both whether there was a privacy interest in the cell phone and
whether there was a proper search of the cell phone incident to arrest, the
court was in no position to anticipate how the iPhone and “app” agreements would change everything. Furthermore, the Finley decision also
unfortunately led other courts to adopt the assumption that there is a privacy right in modern cell phones without employing appropriate analysis
in the context of the post-iPhone era.
In Finley, the defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.70 The conviction was the result of the
defendant’s arrest after he drove another defendant to a controlled purchase conducted by local and federal law enforcement.71 After the arrest,
officers seized and searched a cell phone that was located in the defendant’s pocket.72 Although the cell phone belonged to the defendant’s employer, the defendant was also permitted to use the cell phone for personal use.73 At trial, a federal law enforcement officer testified that several of the text messages found in the phone related to drug use and trafficking.74 On appeal, the defendant asserted that the recovered text messages from the warrantless search of his phone should have been sup66. See discussion infra Part V.
67. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). Quon was arguably the Supreme
Court’s leading cell phone privacy case until, perhaps, Gant and Jones. However, Quon was decided
in 2010, a relatively late era in cell phone technology as the iPhone was already three years old at
that point. The leading lower court decision, Finley, came in 2007—the same year that the iPhone
was released.
68. Id.
69. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
70. Finley, 477 F.3d at 255.
71. Id. at 253–54.
72. Id. at 254.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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pressed at the trial.75 Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately allowed the
text messages into evidence, it did hold that there was a privacy interest
in the cell phone.
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit first had to decide whether the defendant had standing to challenge the search of his cell phone by having
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone.76 To test for the
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court asked “(1) whether the defendant is able to establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
with respect to the place being searched or items being seized, and (2)
whether that expectation of privacy is one which society would recognize
as reasonable.”77 Under this test, the court looks, in part, to whether there
is a property or possessory interest in the thing being searched, whether
there is a subjective privacy expectation that there would be no governmental intrusion, and whether there were measures taken to maintain privacy.78 The court found that the defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone because, even though the defendant expected his employer to read his text messages, he maintained possession
of the cell phone and could have reasonably expected to be free from
intrusion by both the government and the general public.79
Next, the court held that the search of the cell phone was a lawful
search incident to arrest.80 The court reasoned, “It is well settled that in
the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is
also a reasonable search under that Amendment.”81 The court continued,
“Police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or instruments of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any
additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his
person in order to preserve it for use at trial.”82 Noting that the scope of

75. Id. at 258.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting United States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir. 1998)). Note
that this is Justice Harlan’s Katz test. See supra text accompanying note 17.
78. Id. at 258–59 (citing United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1991)).
79. Id. at 259.
80. Id. at 259–60.
81. Id. at 259 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
82. Id. at 259–60 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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the search extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person,83 the
court held that the search was proper.84
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the officers needed
a warrant to search the phone because it was tantamount to a closed container by reaffirming that containers, even closed containers, may be
searched pursuant to a valid custodial arrest.85 Also important to the
court’s holding was its finding that a cell phone “does not fit into the category of ‘property not immediately associated with [the defendant’s]
person’ because it was on his person at the time of his arrest.”86 As a
gloss to the search incident to arrest rule, this distinction is important
because “[o]nce law enforcement officers have reduced . . . personal
property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to
their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee
might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence,
a search of that property is no longer an incident to arrest”; therefore, the
search of the property would then require a warrant.87 By holding that a
cell phone is immediately associated with the defendant’s person, the
court found that the search of the cell phone incident to arrest was proper.88
However, not all courts have followed Finley’s reasoning. For example, in the Northern District of California case of United States v.
Park, San Francisco police narcotics officers had a warrant to search a
home.89 After executing the warrant, the officers arrested the defendants
and transported them to the police station for booking.90 After the defendants were booked and their cell phones were placed into evidence,
the police searched the contents of their cell phones at the police sta83. Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam);
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981) (holding that containers within the arrestee’s
reach may be searched); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1973) (upholding the
search of a cigarette package found on the arrestee’s person)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 260 n.7 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)).
87. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15.
88. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260. Many courts have adopted the Finley approach. Shortly after the
Finley decision, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits adopted its reasoning, and upheld as constitutional
the search of cell phones incident to arrest on the theory of preserving evidence. See United States v.
Young, 278 F. App’x 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). See also United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670
F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012) (upholding the search of a cell phone as a valid search incident to arrest
where the sole purpose of the search was to find the phone’s number); United States v. Murphy, 552
F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that storage capacity does not affect whether a search is constitutional).
89. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573 *1 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
90. Id. at *2.
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tion.91 Rejecting the reasoning in Finley, the court held that the search
was not proper as a search incident to arrest because “cellular phones
should be considered ‘possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the person.’”92 While the court noted that Finley
was distinguishable because there the search was conducted at the location of the arrest, and here the search was conducted after booking, thus
not meeting the “contemporaneous” requirement of Chadwick, the Park
court relied more on the large storage capabilities of modern cell
phones93 and a policy argument that they should never be considered part
of “the person,” only “possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control.”94 The court argued that a contrary holding would have “far-ranging
consequences” because modern cell phones—which the court argued
were more in line with personal computers—contain vast amounts of
personal information and a search of such phones would go beyond the
original “evidence protection” rationale for searches incident to arrest.95
Tellingly, the Park court never overtly considered whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone in the
first place. The court seemed to have assumed that there was such an expectation because of the amount of information contained in the cell
phone, and it proceeded directly to determining whether an exception to
the search warrant requirement applied.96 The court did not consider
whether the defendants exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in
the cell phone or whether that expectation was one that society was prepared to accept as reasonable. The court did not even mention how the
defendants used and treated the data stored in their cell phones. In fact,
the mistake of assuming that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in cell phones, and now smartphones, without giving the issue its due
analysis, is a common one.
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. at *8 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10).
93. Id. (“This is so because modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense
amounts of private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages,
email, video and pictures. Individuals can store highly personal information on their cell phones, and
can record their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and text,
voice and instant messages.”). Id. Note that this case refers to cell phones, but its reasoning and
description of cell phone capabilities could easily be attributed to smartphones.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Presumably, even if the court did analyze whether there was a privacy interest in the
cell phone, the analysis would be outdated. Like Finley, this opinion was issued in 2007, the same
year the iPhone was released. Thus, Park would have similarly not been able to anticipate the changes the iPhone heralded. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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For example, in State v. Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court had to determine whether the search of a cell phone found on the person of an arrestee accused of being a drug dealer was constitutional as a search incident to arrest.97 After first acknowledging that Finley and Park provide
the leading framework for this issue, the court recognized that “[g]iven
the continuing rapid advancements in cell phone technology . . . there are
legitimate concerns regarding the effect of allowing warrantless searches
of cell phones, especially so-called smart phones, which allow for
high-speed Internet access and are capable of storing tremendous
amounts of private data.”98 Initially, the court rejected a distinction between the defendant’s “standard” phone and “smart phones.”99 The defendant in this case did not have what is considered a conventional
“smart phone.”100 However, the court noted that modern “standard” cell
phones, not just smartphones, are capable of performing much more
complex tasks than traditional phones, for example, sending text messages, storing information, and taking pictures.101 On this reasoning, the
court declined to distinguish between modern “traditional” cell phones
and “smart phones.”102 From there, the court determined that a cell
phone’s ability to store large amounts of data is what gives the phone’s
owner “a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain.”103 Like the Finley court, the court
here failed to consider how the defendant used and treated the information in his cell phone as a consideration for determining whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy existed.
97. State v. Smith, 920 N.E. 2d 949, 950–51 (Ohio 2009).
98. Id. at 954.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 956.
101. Id. at 954.
102. Id. The court determined not to draw a legal distinction between smartphones and modern
“standard” cell phones because of their overlapping capabilities. Id. (“[W]e note that in today’s
advanced technological age many ‘standard’ cell phones include a variety of features above and
beyond the ability to place phone calls. Indeed, . . . many cell phones give users the ability to send
text messages and take pictures. Other modern ‘standard’ cell phones can also store and transfer data
and allow users to connect to the Internet. Because basic cell phones in today’s world have a wide
variety of possible functions, it would not be helpful to create a rule that requires officers to discern
the capabilities of a cell phone before acting accordingly.”). Id.
103. Id. at 955. Other courts have also relied on the storage capacity of cell phones for finding
a reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Zavala, 514 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir.
2008); Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012) (holding that an expectation of privacy exists because modern cell phones hold large amounts of private information, including “phonebook information, appointment calendars, text messages, call logs, photographs, audio
and video recordings, web browsing history, electronic documents and user location information.”).
But see People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 508–09 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting the storage capacity reasoning
as too subjective to particular items).
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As illustrated above, the real problem lies in how the courts are determining that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
smartphones/cell phones. Courts are either not giving the issue sufficient
analysis—Smith, for example—or are merely assuming that a privacy
interest exists—Park, for example.104 Even where courts do test whether
the Fourth Amendment applies, the tests are based on outmoded cell
phone paradigms.105 Indeed, a thorough and honest inquiry into the
Fourth Amendment’s applicability to smartphone searches may not occur
if courts refuse to analyze the possible legal significance of the difference between smartphones and cell phones.106 However, after the lower
courts split on their analyses,107 some scholars believed that a pair of
United States Supreme Court decisions offered guidance towards a uniform national method of analyzing the warrantless search of
smartphones/cell phones.108
IV. GANT, JONES, AND THE FUTURE OF CELL PHONE SEARCHES?
A. The Gant and Jones Decisions
Some commenters believe that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Arizona v. Gant109 and United States v. Jones110 foreshadowed the Court’s
future warrantless smartphone/cell phone search jurisprudence.111 However, even these cases assume that the Fourth Amendment protects these
searches and they continue to focus on the search incident to arrest exception.
The Gant decision greatly limited the areas in which police may
search under the search incident to arrest doctrine. Later, courts used
Gant as a basis for limiting searches of cellphones.112 In Gant, after the
defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, police offic-

104. See Smith, 920 N.E. 2d at 950–51. See also Eunice Park, Traffic Ticket Reasonable, Cell
Phone Search Not: Applying the Search-Incident-To-Arrest Exception to the Cell Phone as “Hybrid”, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 429, 460 (2012) (“Most courts that have held a warrantless cell phone
search was reasonable did not extensively discuss the expectation of privacy.”). See, e.g., United
States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573 *1 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
105. See, e.g., Smith, 920 N.E. 2d at 954.
106. See, e.g., id.
107. Compare United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) with United States v.
Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573 *1, *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
108. See infra Part IV.B.
109. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
110. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
111. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
112. Id.
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ers proceeded to search his car.113 The officers discovered cocaine in the
pocket of a jacket that was located on the back seat.114 At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment because he was already
handcuffed in the back of the patrol car and posed no threat to the officers.115 Recognizing that the officers had no probable cause for the search,
the trial court, nonetheless, denied the motion to suppress and held that
the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest.116 The Supreme
Court eventually heard the propriety of the admission of the cocaine into
evidence.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, began its analysis by reaffirming the base rule that searches incident to arrest are applicable only to areas within the arrestee’s immediate control,
“meaning ‘the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.’”117 Ultimately, the Court held the
search was improper under the search incident to arrest exception, and
the evidence should have been suppressed at trial. The Court reasoned,
“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.”118 Specifically, this holding applies
law enforcement’s ability to search all containers located within the vehicle for evidence.119
In Jones, the FBI suspected the defendant of conspiracy in trafficking narcotics in the District of Columbia.120 As part of its investigation,
the FBI received a warrant to use an electronic tracking device on a car
belonging to the defendant’s wife.121 Although the warrant authorized the
FBI to use and install the GPS device within ten days in the District of
Columbia, the FBI agents installed the device on the eleventh day and
outside the District of Columbia.122 Before trial, the defendant moved to
suppress the evidence obtained through the GPS device.123 While the district court suppressed the data that was obtained while the vehicle was
113. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 336–37.
116. Id. at 337.
117. Id. at 335 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
118. Id. at 351.
119. See id.at 345–51.
120. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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parked at the defendant’s residence, it admitted into evidence data that
was gathered while the car was traveling.124 The district court reasoned
that “a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”125 However, the trial in which this evidence was admitted resulted in a hung jury.126 Subsequently, a grand jury returned another conspiracy indictment against the defendant, and, this time, the defendant
was found guilty.127 The appellate court reversed the conviction on the
grounds that the evidence obtained by the warrantless use of the GPS
device violated the Fourth Amendment.128
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,129 said that the Court’s earlier Fourth Amendment cases attach the
Fourth Amendment right to persons, not places, and applied the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test130 to evaluate alleged violations.131 Justice Scalia emphasized that when applying the reasonable expectation of
privacy test, the Court, at the very least, “must ‘assure preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.’”132 Citing various cases and reasoning that
Katz “did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope,” Justice Scalia
said that the Court has “embodied that preservation of past rights in our
very definition of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ which we have
said to be an expectation ‘that has a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.’”133 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the attachment of the
GPS device constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory

124. Id.
125. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
126. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
127. Id. at 948–49.
128. Id. at 949 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
129. The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and
Justice Sotomayor.
130. Note, again, this is Justice Harlan’s Katz test. See supra text accompanying note 17.
131. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
374, 351 (1967)) (additional citations omitted).
132. Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
133. Id. at 951 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)) (emphasis added).
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test.”134 Thus, the search was unconstitutional for going beyond the parameters set by the warrant because the officers physically attached the
GPS device to the vehicle.135
Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion, stated that “it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”136 Justice Sotomayor believed that the “third-party” approach137
was “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.”138 Noting that people routinely disclose everything
from phone numbers dialed, to books read, to medications purchased,
Justice Sotomayor did not “assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”139 Justice
Sotomayor cautioned that under the Supreme Court’s current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, despite societal expectations to privacy, people will only have those interests protected if the Court “ceases to treat
secrecy as a perquisite for privacy.”140
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion,141 criticized the majority
for not explaining how the attachment of the GPS device fits within the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”142 After noting the problems with the majority’s “trespass”
approach and advocating for an expectation of privacy test, Justice Alito
134. Id. at 952 (emphasis added). The majority clarified this comment in the following footnote: “Thus, our theory is not that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with any technical trespass
that led to the gathering of evidence. The Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches
only with regard to those items (persons, houses, papers, and effects) that it enumerates.” Id. at 953
n.8 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Having a trespassory test in addition to the Katz
test presents an interesting question, which is outside the scope of this Note: If the data contained in
the smartphone is not protected under the Fourth Amendment, does the Fourth Amendment at least
protect individuals from police physically handling the smartphone to gain access to the information
contained therein?
135. See id. at 952–54.
136. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
137. Presumably referencing the third-party doctrine. See discussion infra Part VI.
138. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
139. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.
Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need
not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”)) (citing Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”)).
140. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
141. His concurrence is joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan.
142. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
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recognized that test comes with its own problems.143 First, “judges are
apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the [expectation of privacy] test
looks.”144 Second, the test assumes that citizens have a “well-developed
and stable set of privacy expectations.”145 However, Justice Alito asserted that technology can drastically change popular expectations to privacy.146 While he acknowledged that legislatures have the ability to pass
legislation to protect privacy interests,147 Justice Alito pointed out that
statutes regulating the use of GPS technology for law enforcement purposes have not become law, and the best the Court could do in the instant
case was to evaluate the “degree of intrusion that a reasonable person
would not have anticipated.”148 While Justice Alito asserted that the public views the short-term—but not long-term—monitoring of movement
on public streets as reasonable, he also recognized that evolving technology continues to entice the average citizen to trade privacy for convenience.149
While the opinions of Gant and Jones seem to call into question
expectations to privacy in the current technological era—specifically
how societal devaluation of privacy in technology may be eroding the
basis for any Fourth Amendment protections—most subsequent scholarly discussion still focuses on how the Supreme Court would likely rule
on the search of a smartphone/cell phone under the search incident to
arrest exception. Scholars, and for that matter courts, are missing the opportunity to reevaluate whether individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their smartphones.
B. Judicial and Scholarly Analysis of Privacy Expectations Is (Still)
Lacking
Post Gant and Jones, lower courts, if anything, seemed frustrated
by the Supreme Court’s continued allowance of smartphone/cell phone
searches incident to arrest, and its failure to announce a bright-line rule

143. Id. at 960–62.
144. Id. at 962 (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 963 (noting congressional passage of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 to protect against
unwanted intrusions from wiretapping).
148. Id. at 964.
149. Id. at 963–64 (noting that GPS monitoring in cell phones provides users services ranging
from real-time traffic conditions to more social uses, such as finding or avoiding other GPS users).
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that all such searches may only be conducted pursuant to a warrant.150
For example, in United States v. Gomez, the court stated:
Even though we may disagree with the application of [the]
post-Chimel line of cases to the ever-advancing technology of cell
phones, or more specifically to the application of the . . . [container]
rule for searches incident to arrest (as limited by Gant), we are constrained to apply the law as the Supreme Court currently pronounces it.151

Similarly, the court in United States v. Hill recognized that cell phones
are capable of storing large amounts of personal information, but it was
“unwilling to conclude” that cell phone searches are not subject to the
search incident to arrest exception without “guidance from the Supreme
Court or the Ninth Circuit . . . .”152 Interestingly, the Hill court seemed
persuaded by the Park decision but was unwilling to act without binding
precedent.153 Gomez and Hill highlight that courts are cognizant of the
advancements in cell phone technology but are unwilling to affirmatively
examine the consequences of those advancements; instead, they continue
to proceed into search incident to arrest analysis.
After Gant and Jones, even scholars seemed not to heed the Jones
concurrences’ calls to reexamine the privacy interests in smartphones. In
fact, scholars continue to simply focus on the search incident to arrest
exception and its application to smartphones/cell phones. For example,
according to Sara Corradi, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gant can be
directly applied to a person’s privacy interest in his or her smartphone.154
Corradi believes that the reasoning in Gant—that searches incident to
arrest should be limited to areas that pose an actual risk of officer safety
or evidence destruction—applies to “any situation in which officers attempt to conduct a broad search of a suspect’s person and effects, despite
his expectation of privacy, simply because the suspect has been arrested.”155 Specifically, because all the lower courts have found that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their cell phones, Gant’s
reasoning should apply to smartphones.156 Therefore, the Court should
find that a smartphone search is “a gross invasion of privacy, and thus
150. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 2011); United
States v. Hill, No. Cr 10-00261 JSW, 2011 WL 90130, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
151. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
152. Hill, 2011 WL 90130, at *7.
153. Id.
154. Corradi, supra note 23, at 953.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 953–55.

1510

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 38:1491

unconstitutional”157 unless there is a reasonable expectation that evidence
incident to the arrest would be found on phone.158 Essentially, Corradi
argues that smartphones and computers are becoming more and more
similar; therefore, courts should apply the recognized privacy interest in
computers to smartphones.159 While she notes many technological similarities,160 Corradi does not consider the most important dissimilarity—
smartphones and apps downloaded onto smartphones share much of the
user’s “private” information. At most, Corradi relies on Justice
Sotomayor’s concurring comments in Jones—that Justice Sotomayor
“would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”161 Corradi, in turn, assumes
that “[u]nder this theory, individuals should not have less of an expectation of privacy in their smart phones simply due to the amount of information that is shared with the cell phone company or other third parties.”162 Similar to the courts, Corradi does not give full consideration to
how modern smartphones are used.
Even in an article titled “The Whole World Contained: How The
Ubiquitous Use Of Mobile Phones Undermines Your Right To Be Free
From Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,” Mina Ford fails to fully examine whether individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy
when using smartphones.163 Ford argues that law enforcement should
never be able to search a smartphone without a search warrant, or, put
another way, that there should be no warrantless search exception for
smartphones at all (this includes the search incident to arrest exception).164 Ford declares that “[i]t is almost a laughable notion” to believe
that society would not recognize a privacy expectation in cell phones as
reasonable.165 Ford assumes that “mobile phone users have exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of their mobile phones,”
157. Id. at 954.
158. Id. at 961–63.
159. Id. at 958–59.
160. According to Corradi, the similarities include: the ability to make voice calls over the
Internet; the ability to download programs, including messaging programs; and the ability to access
stored information on other devices and on cloud drives. Id. (internal citations omitted).
161. Id. at 955–56 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
162. Id. at 956.
163. Mina Ford, Note, The Whole World Contained: How the Ubiquitous Use of Mobile
Phones Undermines Your Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1077 (2012).
164. Id. at 1103.
165. Id.
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and only offers as evidence for such a claim two online articles that criticize a cellular phone company’s collection of text messages.166 But Ford
does not critically examine how smartphone users interact with their
phones and the data contained therein on a daily basis.
Similar to the problem in the courts, scholarly works seem, at most,
to recognize that there may be a question of whether a privacy interest in
smartphones exists,167 but instead proceed to devote their time to the
search incident to arrest exception.168 If the courts and scholars took the
time to actually consider the current smartphone and data-sharing paradigm, they may discover that finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
is not such an easy task.
V. THE SUPREME COURT MISSED ITS SECOND CHANCE
Indeed, the Supreme Court had a chance to definitively address the
issue of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
smartphones in Riley v. California;169 but, again, the Court assumed such
an expectation existed and moved straight into a search incident to arrest
analysis.170 Riley is actually a consolidated opinion of two different cases
addressing the same issue: “[H]ow the search incident to arrest doctrine
applies to modern cell phones . . . .”171 In the first case, police officers

166. Id. at 1103 n.175 (citing Indu Chandrasekhar et al., Phone Hacking: Timeline of the Scandal, TELEGRAPH (July 23, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/phone-hacking/8634176
/Phone-hacking-timeline-of-a-scandal.html) (citing Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, Carrier IQ ‘May
Have’ Collected Text Messages, ZDNET (Dec. 14, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/
hardware/carrier-iq-may-have-collected-text-messages/17122).
167. For an interesting example of an argument that as smartphones/cell phones become capable of storing even more information, the privacy interest in those phones necessarily increases, see
Daniel Zamani, Note, There’s an Amendment For That: A Comprehensive Application of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169, 198 (2010) (“The full
potential of smart phones has yet to be seen, but it seems certain that their popularity will only continue to grow. As they reach ubiquity, both in society and in people’s lives, the expectation of privacy in them will increase.”).
168. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest: Data Extraction
Devices, Faraday Bags, or Aluminum Foil as a Solution to the Warrantless Cell Phone Search Problem, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 601, 602–03 (2013); Margaret M. Lawton, Warrantless Searches
and Smart Phones: Privacy in the Palm of Your Hand?, 16 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 89, 102–03 (2012);
Park, supra note 104, at 462; Samuel J. H. Beutler, Note, The New World of Mobile Communication:
Redefining the Scope of Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, 15 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 375, 386–90 (2013); Ashley B. Snyder, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155,
161–62 (2011).
169. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
170. Id. at 2482–85.
171. Id. at 2484. Even the Court’s framing of its issue statement is a testament to the lack of
consideration given to whether a Fourth Amendment “search” took place at all as determined
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stopped the defendant for driving with expired tags.172 Upon contact with
the defendant, the police officers discovered that he had a suspended license and arrested him.173 During the search incident to the arrest, the
officers found “items associated with the ‘Bloods’ street gang.”174 This
search also included one of the officers seizing a smartphone175 from the
defendant’s pants pocket.176 “The officer accessed information on the
phone and noticed that some words (presumably in text messages or a
contacts list) were preceded by the letters ‘CK’—a label that, he believed, stood for ‘Crip Killers,’ a slang term for members of the Bloods
gang.”177 Two hours later, a detective “specializing in gangs” also went
through the phone, “looking for evidence, because . . . gang members
will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of themselves with
the guns.”178 The detective found a video where the word “Blood” was
used as well as pictures of the defendant standing in front of a car that
the officers believed to be involved in an earlier shooting.179
The defendant was ultimately charged with multiple crimes related
to the earlier shooting, an aggravating factor being that the crimes were
gang-related.180 The defendant unsuccessfully moved pre-trial to suppress the evidence obtained from the smartphone on the grounds that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers did not obtain a warrant, and none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement
applied.181 The trial court admitted the smartphone evidence, and the defendant was convicted on all counts.182 A California appellate court affirmed both the conviction and the evidence admission, holding that the
“Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of cell phone data incident to an arrest, so long as the cell phone was immediately associated
with the arrestee’s person.”183

through the reasonable expectations test. Id. The Court couches the issue only in the search incident
to arrest exception. Id.
172. Id. at 2480.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The Court defined “smart phone” as “cell phone with a broad range of other functions
based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.” Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2480–81.
179. Id. at 2481.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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In the second case, the defendant was arrested after police officers
observed him selling drugs from a car.184 At the police station, an officer
seized a “flip phone”185 from the defendant and noticed that the phone
was receiving calls from a source labeled “my house.”186 The officer
opened the phone, looked up the phone number associated with “my
house,” and traced that number to an apartment building.187 The officers
also saw that the phone’s wallpaper was a picture of a woman and a baby.188 The officers then went to the apartment building, saw a mailbox
with the defendant’s name on it, and observed someone who resembled
the woman from the wallpaper through a window.189 Based on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the apartment,
where they subsequently found drugs and a gun.190
The defendant was charged with multiple drug and firearm
crimes.191 Although the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the apartment, arguing that “it was the fruit of
an unconstitutional search of his cell phone,” the trial court denied the
motion.192 As such, the defendant was convicted of all charges.193 However, the First Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and
vacated the convictions.194 The First Circuit held that a search warrant for
the flip phone was indeed required because “cell phones are distinct from
other physical possessions that may be searched incident to arrest without a warrant, because of the amount of personal data cell phones contain
and the negligible threat they pose to law enforcement interests.”195
On the facts of these cases, pundits expected the Supreme Court to
not just answer whether police officers generally may search a
smartphone/cell phone under the search incident to arrest exception, but
also to address the implications of modern technology—specifically
whether there is a different standard for “flip phones” versus “smart

184. Id.
185. Id. The Court defined a “flip phone” as “a kind of phone that is flipped open for use and
that generally has a smaller range of features than a smart phone.” Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2482.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)).
195. Id. (citing Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8–11).
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phones.”196 However, like the Court’s opinions and scholarly articles that
came before it, Riley missed the chance to address whether there truly
was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and only focused on the
search incident to arrest exception.197 After the Court quoted the Fourth
Amendment, it moved directly into analyzing the issue under the search
incident to arrest exception.198 In doing so, the Court stated:
As the text makes clear, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is “reasonableness.” Our cases have determined that
where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant. Such a warrant ensures that the inferences to support a search are drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. In
the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within
a specific exception to the warrant requirement.199

As such, while the Court recognized that “modern cell phones, which are
now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy,”200 the Court spent the vast remainder of the opinion solely focused on the search incident to arrest exception.
While acknowledging that the Government “suggested” that “officers should always be able to search a phone’s call log,201 as they did in”
the flip phone case at bar, the Court punted analyzing the issue by pointing out that “[t]here is no dispute here that the officers engaged in a
search” of the flip phone.202 In that one sentence, the Supreme Court
avoided analyzing the preliminary Fourth Amendment question of
whether there was a “search” by discussing (1) does the individual subjected to the search exhibit an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) is

196. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Decide Case on Police Cellphone Searches,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-decidecase-on-police-cellphone-searches/2014/01/17/b0f3c61e-7f8a-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html.
197. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473.
198. Id. at 2482.
199. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 2484.
201. Id. at 2492. To support its “suggestion,” the Government cited Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979). Id. See also discussion infra Part VII.
202. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492–93. Indeed, by arguing that the officers should be able to look at
the phone’s call log, the Government was, in fact, arguing that no “search” under the Fourth
Amendment occurred. Id.
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that expectation “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”203
Ultimately, the Court held that police must always get a search warrant before searching a smartphone/cell phone because once law enforcement seizes the phone, there is neither an officer safety concern nor
a reason to believe that evidence within the phone would be destroyed
before a search warrant could be obtained.204 As will be discussed in the
following two Parts of this Note, the way individuals use the data in their
smartphones and consideration of the third-party doctrine should have
justified the Riley Court in discussing whether a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment occurred at all.205
VI. SHARING TOO MUCH INFORMATION
As one scholar so aptly stated,
Many of us are ambivalent about the value of privacy. On the one
hand, for example, a lack of privacy is typically the stuff of dystopias. But on the other hand, some limitations on privacy, whatever the
justification, give rise among many persons to only modest concern,
if not to utter indifference.206

Most smartphone users fall more on the “utter indifference” side of this
privacy–concern spectrum. Under the current technological paradigm,
smartphone users routinely disclose the phone numbers they call, the
websites they visit, and the recipients of emails sent.207 Moreover,
smartphone users also share many other aspects of their lives with others,
ranging from their locations208 to even their moods.209
203. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. Interestingly, towards the end of the Riley
opinion, the Court did come close to discussing third-party doctrine as it applies to information
contained in smartphones/cell phones. However, the Court did not actually refer to the “third-party
doctrine.” For the definition of the third-party doctrine and discussion on its applicability to
smartphones, see discussion infra Part VII.
204. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–88, 2495.
205. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.
206. R. George Wright, Some Reasons for Our Ambivalence About the Value of Privacy, 22
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 45, 45–46 (2013).
207. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
208. Shane Dingman, Here I Am! More Smartphone Users Share Geo-location Data: Survey,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/
digital-culture/here-i-am-more-smartphone-users-share-geo-location-data-survey/article14276866/.
This article describes the results of a Pew survey, finding that that 30% of persons over the age of 18
enable the geo-location features of their social media accounts to track their location through their
cell phones. Moreover, this article asserts individuals find allowing passive geo-location tracking
more desirable than pressing a button in an app to announce their location. See id. On the other hand,
only about 35% of smartphone users have at one point “explicitly turned off” the geo-location features of their phones. Id.
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As of February 13, 2014, there were 1,132,053 apps in the Android
market.210 Likewise, as of January 2014, Apple’s App Store contained
1,100,827 apps.211 While Apple and Google do not often report on cumulative or daily downloads, as of early 2013, both companies reported approximately 50 billion total app downloads worldwide.212 Moreover, the
frequency of app downloads seems to be increasing exponentially; in a
three-month period in 2013, Apple reported 5 billion app downloads, and
in a single month in 2013, Android reported 2.5 billion app downloads.213
On average, an individual smartphone user has installed twenty-six
apps.214 While the sheer number of downloads is impressive, what is really impressive is what the numbers say about society’s apathy towards
privacy.
Lately, various governments and companies have shown concern
over apps that do not disclose their data collection policies. For example,
in January 2013, California’s Attorney General released a twenty-threepage report on mobile privacy with the intent to improve privacy protections.215 In California, apps that collect personal information are required
to display their privacy policies or face a $2,500 fine per app download.216 To bring developers in line with California’s law, Amazon,
Google, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, and Research in Motion “agreed to

209. How Are You Feeling? Microsoft’s Mood-Sensing Smartphone Can Tell, GMA NEWS
ONLINE, (July 2, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/315610/scitech/
technology/how-are-you-feeling-microsoft-s-mood-sensing-smartphone-can-tell. This online article
describes Microsoft’s efforts to develop a program that senses a cell phone user’s mood based on
how he or she uses the phone. See generally id. In turn, a user’s mood could be automatically shared
to social networks, allowing others to better know how and when to communicate with the cell
phone user. See id.
210. Number of Android Applications, APPBRAIN, http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-ofandroid-apps (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
211. App Store Metrics, POCKETGAMER.BIZ, http://148apps.biz/app-store-metrics/?mpage=
appcount (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
212. Benedict Evans, How Many Apps Do Android and iOS Users Download?, BENEDICT
EVANS (May 16, 2013), http://ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2013/5/16/how-many-apps-do-androidand-ios-users-download.
213. Id.
214. Tony Bradley, Study Finds Most Mobile Apps Put Your Security and Privacy at Risk, PC
WORLD (Dec. 5, 2013, 09:54 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2068824/study-finds-mostmobile-apps-put-your-security-and-privacy-at-risk.html.
215. KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY ON THE GO:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM (2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/
files/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf.
216. Joe Mullin, CA to App Devs: Get Privacy Policies or Risk $2500-per-download Fines,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2012, 06:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/ca-to-appdevs-get-privacy-policies-or-risk-2500-per-download-fines/.
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a set of privacy principles, which include[d] allowing consumers to review the privacy policy for any app before they download it.”217
The federal government has also taken notice of the lack of privacy
policy disclosures in apps. In a study focusing on apps designed for children, the Federal Trade Commission determined that “[t]he mobile app
marketplace is growing at a tremendous speed, and many consumer protections, including privacy and privacy disclosures, have not kept pace
with this development.”218 The study, looking at a random sample of
“kid” apps,219 found that only 20% of the apps surveyed disclosed any
information about the app’s privacy practices.220 However, “60[%] of the
surveyed apps collect geolocation, phone number, contacts, call logs,
unique identifiers, and other information stored on the device; and send
the information to the app developers or to advertising networks, analytics companies, and other third parties.”221
Combining the research above, of the twenty-six apps on an average user’s smartphone, fifteen collect some sort of personal information;
of those fifteen apps, the user has only seen approximately five privacy
agreements.222 However, presumably due to California’s privacy law and
the agreement between the major tech companies, all individuals, not just
Californians, are now exposed to privacy policies. Of course, this is not
to say that the privacy policies actually protect individuals’ private information contained within their smartphones.

217. Mathew J. Schwartz, California Targets Mobile Apps for Missing Privacy Policies,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 31, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/
California-targets-mobile-apps-for-missing-privacy-policies/d/d-id/1107139?.
218. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS: CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE
DISAPPOINTING 3 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
mobile-apps-kids-current-privacy-disclosures-are-disappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf.
219. Id. at A2.
220. FTC Report Faults Mobile App Makers on Privacy, FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN +
SELZ, PC (Jan. 7, 2013), http://fkks.com/news/ftc-report-faults-mobile-app-makers-on-privacy.
221. Id.
222. These calculations are for demonstration purposes only. As far as my research has discovered, no one has conducted a study that examines the general population of apps (not just children’s
apps) and surveyed how often individuals read privacy policies and make the choice of whether or
not to download the app based on the privacy policy.
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A good example of a privacy policy shown to users before downloading an app is the privacy policy provided for Angry Birds. Within
Google Play and on an Android smartphone, one must accept the following information before being allowed to download Angry Birds:

Should a user be determined to look up the privacy policy published on the Rovio Entertainment website,223 the user would discover
that while Rovio says that it maintains the right to disclose collected
“non-personal” data from the user’s smartphone, Rovio also states it
“may employ third party ad serving technologies . . . .”224 In order to present personalized advertisements to the user, these third parties “may
collect and use data . . . including but not limited to, data such as IP address, Device ID, MAC address, installed software, application usage
data, hardware type, Operating System information, browser information, unique identifiers in browser cookies, Flash cookies, and
HTML5 local storage, Internet and on-line usage information . . . .”225
Moreover, Rovio does not warrant that these third parties will not use an
individual’s personal data—that use is subject to the third parties’ own
terms of service, which the user agrees to by downloading Angry Birds,
but is not described in Rovio’s Privacy Policy.226 Indeed, while Rovio
provides a link to opt out of some of the “behaviorally targeted advertis223. Who We Are, ROVIO, http://www.rovio.com/en/about-us/Company (last visited Mar. 17,
2015). Rovio Entertainment is the creator and publisher of Angry Birds.
224. Privacy Policy, ROVIO, http://www.rovio.com/privacy (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
225. Id.
226. See id.
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ing,” the user must still “note that the links above may not reach all [of]
Rovio’s advertising partners and certain behaviorally targeted advertising
may still be displayed to you. If you want to be certain that no behaviorally targeted advertisements are displayed to you, please do not use or
access the Services.”227 Cynically, these terms may be read as a disclaimer that should an individual download Angry Birds, it is highly likely their personal information will be shared.
Nonetheless, no matter the accuracy of the above calculations, and
even if one assumes that smartphone users are exposed to privacy policies for all of their downloaded apps, one principle is clear: people are
not deterred by the frequent and wide-ranging collection of their personal
data. At a minimum, the formal practice of allowing a developer to gather personal data in exchange for being able to download an app is a
widespread practice.
What is to be made, then, of Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s comments on privacy interests in the new technological era from Jones? If
the test is whether the individual being searched exhibits a subjective
expectation of privacy and whether society recognizes that expectation as
reasonable, the numbers above seriously call into question whether there
is an expectation of privacy in smartphones.
VII. TRADITIONAL PHONE PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE AS THE DOWNFALL
OF PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS?
To answer Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s calls to reexamine privacy expectations, it seems logical to apply the third-party doctrine from
the Court’s reasoning in Smith v. Maryland.228 In Smith, a telephone
company, at law enforcement’s request, installed a pen register at its office to track telephone numbers dialed to the victim of a robbery and
threatening phone calls.229 Law enforcement did not get a search warrant
before the pen register was installed.230 The pen register eventually led to
an arrest; however, the defendant moved to suppress all information derived from the pen register on the grounds that its use constituted a warrantless search.231 The Supreme Court held that the use of the pen register did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.232
227. Id.
228. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
229. Id. at 737. A pen register is a device that records numbers dialed on a traditional telephone. Id. at 736 n.1.
230. Id. at 737.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 745–46.
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The Supreme Court reasoned that “[a]ll telephone users realize that
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is
through the telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed.”233 Moreover, the Court stated that “[a]ll subscribers realize . . . that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance
(toll) calls on their monthly bills.”234 Because of this knowledge, the Supreme Court concluded that it is “too much to believe” that people “harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”235
Even further, the Supreme Court held that a privacy expectation in
numbers dialed is not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”236 This conclusion was based on the rule that “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties.”237 The Court explained that individuals risk the information they convey to third parties being disclosed to the government,
even if the information was “revealed on the assumption that it [would]
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party [would] not be betrayed.”238 In Smith, the defendant voluntarily
conveyed his phone number when he placed the phone call.239 Therefore,
there was no “search” under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant expected the phone company was storing his phone number and because he voluntarily disclosed his number to the phone company.240
Under the reasoning in Smith, it is difficult to see how a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in smartphones. Indeed, this was the exact
concern expressed by Justice Sotomayor in Jones.241 As recently as 2006,
a federal district court applied Smith and held that there was no privacy
expectation in phone numbers dialed from cell phones.242 With a consistent application of the doctrine, this reasoning would extend to all information shared from one’s smartphone. With more than half of all apps
collecting personal data, a California law requiring app developers to
clearly display privacy policies, and the major tech companies agreeing
233. Id. at 742.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 743.
236. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
237. Id. at 743–44 (internal citations omitted). Without explicitly naming it, the Court was
defining and invoking the third-party doctrine.
238. Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1979)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 745–46.
241. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
242. Beckwith v. Erie County Water Authority, 413 F. Supp. 2d 214, 224 (2006).
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to allow consumers to review privacy polices before download—all with
the knowledge that people are not deterred in continuing to download
apps and share information—it may be “too much to believe” that people
harbor any subjective privacy expectations in information stored in their
smartphones.243 Society may have very well come to the point where
people have been enticed to trade privacy for convenience.244
Applying the third-party doctrine to all information contained in
smartphones is not necessarily that far-fetched. In 2010, the Fifth Circuit
held that a party may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
“subscriber information” due to the third-party doctrine.245 In United
States v. Bynum, the defendant had no subjective privacy expectation to
his name, email address, telephone number, and physical address because
he “voluntarily conveyed all this information to his internet and phone
companies . . . [and] ‘assumed the risk that th[os]e company[ies] would
reveal [that information] to police.’”246 Sharing subscriber information is
no different from allowing an app to access information on one’s
smartphone in exchange for use of that app. Therefore, under the reasoning of Bynum, there may be no reasonable expectation of privacy in
smartphones.
Similarly, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, a federal
district court in Maryland applied the third-party doctrine to GPS information obtained from a cell phone.247 In United States v. Graham, the
court held that GPS locations provided by cell phones248 fell squarely
under the third-party doctrine and were subject to warrantless searches.249
Graham provides that even without fully reexamining whether a reasonable privacy interest in individuals’ smartphones exists, courts are willing to apply the third-party doctrine to smartphone/cell phone searches.
While Bynum and Graham are examples of the furtherance of the thirdparty doctrine and not necessarily specific analyses of reasonable expectations to privacy, they give notice to people to no longer expect that the
Fourth Amendment protects their smartphones’ information. Put another
way, the more courts widen existing warrantless search exceptions, the
243. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
244. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
245. United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010). “Subscriber information” is
information that a user provides to a company—in this case, Yahoo—for the privilege of maintaining a user profile and account. See id. at 162, 164.
246. Id. at 164 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)).
247. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012).
248. In this case, the GPS location was provided by the cell phone connecting to regional towers, not through modern GPS technology. Id. at 387.
249. Id. at 400.

1522

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 38:1491

more people should not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
smartphones to begin with.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The courts’ jurisprudence and scholars’ writings on reasonable expectations to privacy in smartphones are unsatisfactory. These sources
either simply assume that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy or
do not give the question adequate analysis. While the Supreme Court
itself has avoided the issue, concurrences by Justices Sotomayor and
Alito open the door for lower courts and scholars to take up the task.
However, the topic is still largely under-examined.
In light of advancements in smartphone technology, how people use
their smartphones, and what people give up in exchange for such uses,
courts need to reexamine whether there is any longer a reasonable expectation of privacy in the smartphone era.250 An initial application of the
reasonable expectation test, à la the third-party doctrine, suggests that
there may not be any such expectation. Courts and scholars need to step
back, take notice of the important changes in smartphone use and technology, and carefully address the important question of whether there is,
in fact, a reasonable expectation of privacy in smartphones.

250. Exactly how the courts should rule on this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For an
interesting discussion on the various methods the courts could use to determine reasonable expectations, see Daniel T. Pesciotta, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st
Century, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187 (2012).

